Sunday, July 11, 2010
Saturday, July 10, 2010
Friday, June 11, 2010
The drop in the stock market (1,000 points)
The solution? Cut — don’t raise — taxes. And bring down the deficit through massive spending cuts. Reduce our borrowing needs by slashing our spending. Free up capital to feed job growth.
It should be evident to all that Obamanomics is a disaster. It reminds one of nothing so much as the Medieval practice of bleeding the patient to make him well by expelling the evil spirits that dwelt within. When the patient did not recover, they just bled him more and, when he died, they just said that the spirits killed him. The practice of spending, borrowing and then taxing to fuel job growth is the modern analogy.
It should be evident to all that Obamanomics is a disaster. It reminds one of nothing so much as the Medieval practice of bleeding the patient to make him well by expelling the evil spirits that dwelt within. When the patient did not recover, they just bled him more and, when he died, they just said that the spirits killed him. The practice of spending, borrowing and then taxing to fuel job growth is the modern analogy.
Wednesday, June 9, 2010
THE REAL LULA.
Brazil closer to control the whole industrial cycle of uranium processing.
Brazil will be ready to control the whole industrial cycle of uranium processing, from extraction of the radioactive mineral to its final conversion into fuel, in large volumes, by the end of the year, according to military sources.
The Coordinator of the Nuclear Propulsion Program belonging to the Brazilian Navy Captain André Luis Ferreira quoted by the government news Agency Brazil said that once the country has the necessary technology to complete the nuclear cycle, this will grant the country independence from other suppliers in the process of uranium enrichment.
It is scheduled that the first phase of a plant for the production of uranium hexafluoride, from which enriched uranium is developed, should be completed at the military complex or Aramar in the state of Sao Paulo sometime late this year.
Captain Ferreira said that residues generated from the hexafluoride process will be treated several times to minimize the environment impact.
The announcement of the hexafluoride plant occurs just a week after President Lula da Silva together with the Turkish Prime Minister helped strike a deal with Iran regarding its nuclear fuel which has triggered an ongoing international diplomatic confrontation. Iran’s nuclear fuel according to the agreement reached will be partly enriched in Turkey.
Lula da Silva has repeatedly defended Iran’s right to develop its own nuclear program for peaceful purposes. Similarly Vice-president Jose Alencar had publicly defended Brazil’s right to develop nuclear weapons as a dissuasive element and for the defence of its own territory and natural resources particularly the rich offshore oil deposits. This includes the construction of nuclear powered submersibles, which is a long cherished project of the Brazilian navy.
Brazil has two nuclear plants in the city of Angra do Reis, state of Rio de Janeiro which contributes with 3% of power to the national grid. Since uranium enrichment in Brazil on an industrial scale only begun this year but mostly on an experimental basis, most of the enriched fuel at 4%, for the current power plants comes from overseas.
Ferreira also said that the new processing plant will help the navy have its first reactor for the country’s first nuclear submarine by 2014. The reactor will in a first stage function with uranium enriched 5% that will later increase to 20%.
“The Navy’s reactor will help as a model for future nuclear plants “, said Ferreira. He also anticipated that Brazil should reach nuclear fuel self sufficiency by 2014 and the first nuclear powered submarine will begin to be constructed in Brazil in 2016, to be finished and launched by 2021. The submarine will be developed with French technology and is based on the Scorpone submersibles model.
Monday, June 7, 2010
The Issue of Compulsion in Religion:
Islam is What Its Followers Make of It
by Daniel Pipes
New York Sun
September 28, 2004
http://www.danielpipes.org/2110/the-issue-of-compulsion-in-religion-islam-is-what-its
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Translations of this item:
■Arabic
■Chinese (S)
■Danish
■Finnish
■French
■German
■Hebrew
■Hindi
■Italian
■Persian
■Polish
■Portuguese
■Slovak
■Spanish
■Swedish
What do Muslims believe regarding freedom of religious choice? A Koranic verse (2:256) answers: "There is no compulsion in religion"(in Arabic: la ikrah fi'd-din). That sounds clear-cut and the Islamic Center of Southern California insists it is, arguing that it shows how Islam anticipated the principles in the U.S. Constitution. The center sees the First Amendment ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof") as based on concepts in the Koran's no-compulsion verse.
In a similar spirit, a former chief justice of Pakistan, S.A. Rahman, argues that the Koranic phrase contains "a charter of freedom of conscience unparalleled in the religious annals of mankind." To a Western sensibility, this interpretation makes intuitive sense. Thus does Alan Reynolds, an economist at the CATO Institute, write in the Washington Times that the verse signifies that the Koran "counsels religious tolerance."
Were it only so simple.
In fact, this deceptively simple phrase historically has had a myriad of meanings. Here are some of them, mostly premodern, deriving from two outstanding recent books, Patricia Crone's God's Rule: Government and Islam (Columbia University Press) and Yohanan Friedman's Tolerance and Coercion in Islam (Cambridge University Press), augmented by my own research. Proceeding from least liberal to most liberal, the no-compulsion phrase is considered variously to have been:
•Abrogated: The passage was overridden by subsequent Koranic verses (such as 9:73: "O Prophet! Struggle against the unbelievers and hypocrites and be harsh with them").
•Purely symbolic: The phrase is a description, not an imperative. Islam's truth is so obvious that to coerce someone to become a Muslim does not amount to "compulsion"; or else being made to embrace Islam after defeat in war is not viewed as "compulsion."
•Spiritual, not practical: Governments may indeed compel external obedience, though they, of course, cannot compel how Muslims think.
•Limited in time and place: It applied uniquely to Jews in Medina in the seventh century.
•Limited to non-Muslims who live under and accept Muslim rule: Some jurists say it applies only to "Peoples of the Book" (Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians); others say it applies to all infidels.
•Excludes some non-Muslims: Apostates, women, children, prisoners of war, and others can indeed be compelled. (This is the standard interpretation that has applied in most times and places.)
•Limited to all non-Muslims: Muslims must abide by the tenets of Islam and may not apostatize.
•Limited to Muslims: Muslims may shift from one interpretation of their faith to another (such as from Sunni to Shia), but may not leave Islam.
•Applied to all persons: Reaching the true faith must be achieved through trial and testing, and compulsion undercuts this process.
Massive disagreement over a short phrase is typical, for believers argue over the contents of all sacred books, not just the Koran. The debate over the no-compulsion verse has several important implications.
First, it shows that Islam - like all religions - is whatever believers make of it. The choices for Muslims range from Taliban-style repression to Balkan-style liberality. There are few limits; and there is no "right" or "wrong" interpretation. Muslims have a nearly clean slate to resolve what "no compulsion" means in the 21st century.
Conversely, nonspecialists should be very cautious about asserting the meaning of the Koran, which is fluid and subjective. When Alan Reynolds wrote that the no-compulsion verse means the Koran "counsels religious tolerance," he intended well but in fact misled his readers.
Further, many other areas of Islam have parallels to this debate. Muslims can decide afresh what jihad signifies, what rights women have, what role government should play, what forms of interest on money should be banned, plus much else. How they resolve these great issues affects the whole world.
Finally, although Muslims alone will make these decisions, Westerners can influence their direction. Repressive elements (such as the Saudi regime) can be set back by a reduced dependence on oil. More liberal Muslims (such as the Atatürkists) can be marginalized by letting an Islamist-led Turkey enter the European Union.
What non-Muslims do also has potentially a great impact on whether "no compulsion in religion" translates into religious tolerance or permits (as in the case of Salman Rushdie) a license to kill.
by Daniel Pipes
New York Sun
September 28, 2004
http://www.danielpipes.org/2110/the-issue-of-compulsion-in-religion-islam-is-what-its
Print Send Comment RSS Share
Translations of this item:
■Arabic
■Chinese (S)
■Danish
■Finnish
■French
■German
■Hebrew
■Hindi
■Italian
■Persian
■Polish
■Portuguese
■Slovak
■Spanish
■Swedish
What do Muslims believe regarding freedom of religious choice? A Koranic verse (2:256) answers: "There is no compulsion in religion"(in Arabic: la ikrah fi'd-din). That sounds clear-cut and the Islamic Center of Southern California insists it is, arguing that it shows how Islam anticipated the principles in the U.S. Constitution. The center sees the First Amendment ("Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof") as based on concepts in the Koran's no-compulsion verse.
In a similar spirit, a former chief justice of Pakistan, S.A. Rahman, argues that the Koranic phrase contains "a charter of freedom of conscience unparalleled in the religious annals of mankind." To a Western sensibility, this interpretation makes intuitive sense. Thus does Alan Reynolds, an economist at the CATO Institute, write in the Washington Times that the verse signifies that the Koran "counsels religious tolerance."
Were it only so simple.
In fact, this deceptively simple phrase historically has had a myriad of meanings. Here are some of them, mostly premodern, deriving from two outstanding recent books, Patricia Crone's God's Rule: Government and Islam (Columbia University Press) and Yohanan Friedman's Tolerance and Coercion in Islam (Cambridge University Press), augmented by my own research. Proceeding from least liberal to most liberal, the no-compulsion phrase is considered variously to have been:
•Abrogated: The passage was overridden by subsequent Koranic verses (such as 9:73: "O Prophet! Struggle against the unbelievers and hypocrites and be harsh with them").
•Purely symbolic: The phrase is a description, not an imperative. Islam's truth is so obvious that to coerce someone to become a Muslim does not amount to "compulsion"; or else being made to embrace Islam after defeat in war is not viewed as "compulsion."
•Spiritual, not practical: Governments may indeed compel external obedience, though they, of course, cannot compel how Muslims think.
•Limited in time and place: It applied uniquely to Jews in Medina in the seventh century.
•Limited to non-Muslims who live under and accept Muslim rule: Some jurists say it applies only to "Peoples of the Book" (Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians); others say it applies to all infidels.
•Excludes some non-Muslims: Apostates, women, children, prisoners of war, and others can indeed be compelled. (This is the standard interpretation that has applied in most times and places.)
•Limited to all non-Muslims: Muslims must abide by the tenets of Islam and may not apostatize.
•Limited to Muslims: Muslims may shift from one interpretation of their faith to another (such as from Sunni to Shia), but may not leave Islam.
•Applied to all persons: Reaching the true faith must be achieved through trial and testing, and compulsion undercuts this process.
Massive disagreement over a short phrase is typical, for believers argue over the contents of all sacred books, not just the Koran. The debate over the no-compulsion verse has several important implications.
First, it shows that Islam - like all religions - is whatever believers make of it. The choices for Muslims range from Taliban-style repression to Balkan-style liberality. There are few limits; and there is no "right" or "wrong" interpretation. Muslims have a nearly clean slate to resolve what "no compulsion" means in the 21st century.
Conversely, nonspecialists should be very cautious about asserting the meaning of the Koran, which is fluid and subjective. When Alan Reynolds wrote that the no-compulsion verse means the Koran "counsels religious tolerance," he intended well but in fact misled his readers.
Further, many other areas of Islam have parallels to this debate. Muslims can decide afresh what jihad signifies, what rights women have, what role government should play, what forms of interest on money should be banned, plus much else. How they resolve these great issues affects the whole world.
Finally, although Muslims alone will make these decisions, Westerners can influence their direction. Repressive elements (such as the Saudi regime) can be set back by a reduced dependence on oil. More liberal Muslims (such as the Atatürkists) can be marginalized by letting an Islamist-led Turkey enter the European Union.
What non-Muslims do also has potentially a great impact on whether "no compulsion in religion" translates into religious tolerance or permits (as in the case of Salman Rushdie) a license to kill.
"No Compulsion In Religion":
57 Pakistani Hindus convert to Islam under pressure
"There is no compulsion in religion" -- Qur'an 2:256
So that means that the Muslims who pressured these Hindus are Misunderstanders of Islam, right? Not necessarily. The dhimma, after all, mandates discrimination against the "protected" or "guilty" people, the dhimmis. If dhimmis wish to escape the crushing tax burden and the other deprivations of dhimmitude, all they need to do is convert to Islam. If a dhimmi did convert under such circumstances, Islamic law would not regard his conversion as compelled or coerced. When the Muslims in the story below stopped eating food prepared by Hindus, they were simply acting in accord with the Qur'an's labeling of polytheists as "unclean" (9:28). If a Hindu, seeing his business fall off drastically, then converted to Islam to avoid financial ruin, such a conversion would not be regarded as forced at all -- at least by the convert's new Muslim brethren. They would regard the suffering the convert experienced as a Hindu merely as the natural consequence of his rebellion against Allah and Muhammad, and his conversion as a free response to those consequences.
"57 Pakistani Hindus convert to Islam 'under pressure,'" by Amir Mir for DNA, May 28 (thanks to Dolmance):
ISLAMABAD: Over 50 Pakistani Hindus have converted to Islam in the Sialkot district of Punjab within a week (between May 14 and May 19) under pressure from their Muslim employers in a bid to retain their jobs and survive in the Muslim-dominated society.
As many as 35 Hindus converted to Islam on May 14, another 14 on May 17 and eight on May 19, 2010.
All the 57 Hindus who have converted belong to the Pasroor town of Sialkot.
According to some Pakistani electronic media reports, Mangut Ram, a close relative of some of the new converts, who lives in Sialkot, said that these Hindus had to embrace Islam because they were under pressure from their Muslim employers.
He said four Hindu brothers along with their families lived in the village of Nikki Pindi. Mangut Ram said that Hans Raj, Kans Raj, Meena/Kartar and Sardari Lal along with his nephews and sons worked at an eatery in Karachi.
According to Mangut Ram, his co workers often used to speak against Hindus in Karachi where his family worked. "The owner of the shop where I worked said that after a few months of his employing me the sales dropped drastically because people avoided purchasing and eating edibles prepared by Hindus. Many people opposed the large presence of Hindu employees at his shop and my boss felt pressured to change the situation," he added.
Ram said Sardari Lal and his brother Meena/Kartar had worked at the sweets shops for several years and made a decent living that allowed them to support their families.
He said other Muslims employees of the nearby shops discriminated against them and persecuted them. The shop owner was forced to think about their future at his establishment. "That was when the two brothers and their families decided to embrace Islam in order to keep their jobs and be secure," he added.
Ram confirmed that 13 family members of Sardari Lal, 12 members of Meena/ Kartar, their nephew Kans Raj's son Boota Ram along with three adults and several children of these families embraced Islam on May 14, 2010.
He said that Sardari Lal's older brothers Hans Raj and Kans Raj remained Hindus. Hans Raj too has said that he might consider converting to save his job. He said that life was 'just easier if one was Muslim' and he wouldn't be discriminated against.
Ram said that 14 Hindus of the Tapiala village had embraced Islam on May 17 because they were extremely poor and could not get jobs because no one would employ the large Hindu family.
He said that another relative of his, Parkash, who lived in the village of Seowal, along with his eight family members had embraced Islam in order to save their lands.
"After embracing Islam, Parkash Ram told me that Muslim neighbours had been mistreating him and had forced him to convert," Mangut Ram said.
Posted by Robert on June 7, 2010 3:47 AM
"There is no compulsion in religion" -- Qur'an 2:256
So that means that the Muslims who pressured these Hindus are Misunderstanders of Islam, right? Not necessarily. The dhimma, after all, mandates discrimination against the "protected" or "guilty" people, the dhimmis. If dhimmis wish to escape the crushing tax burden and the other deprivations of dhimmitude, all they need to do is convert to Islam. If a dhimmi did convert under such circumstances, Islamic law would not regard his conversion as compelled or coerced. When the Muslims in the story below stopped eating food prepared by Hindus, they were simply acting in accord with the Qur'an's labeling of polytheists as "unclean" (9:28). If a Hindu, seeing his business fall off drastically, then converted to Islam to avoid financial ruin, such a conversion would not be regarded as forced at all -- at least by the convert's new Muslim brethren. They would regard the suffering the convert experienced as a Hindu merely as the natural consequence of his rebellion against Allah and Muhammad, and his conversion as a free response to those consequences.
"57 Pakistani Hindus convert to Islam 'under pressure,'" by Amir Mir for DNA, May 28 (thanks to Dolmance):
ISLAMABAD: Over 50 Pakistani Hindus have converted to Islam in the Sialkot district of Punjab within a week (between May 14 and May 19) under pressure from their Muslim employers in a bid to retain their jobs and survive in the Muslim-dominated society.
As many as 35 Hindus converted to Islam on May 14, another 14 on May 17 and eight on May 19, 2010.
All the 57 Hindus who have converted belong to the Pasroor town of Sialkot.
According to some Pakistani electronic media reports, Mangut Ram, a close relative of some of the new converts, who lives in Sialkot, said that these Hindus had to embrace Islam because they were under pressure from their Muslim employers.
He said four Hindu brothers along with their families lived in the village of Nikki Pindi. Mangut Ram said that Hans Raj, Kans Raj, Meena/Kartar and Sardari Lal along with his nephews and sons worked at an eatery in Karachi.
According to Mangut Ram, his co workers often used to speak against Hindus in Karachi where his family worked. "The owner of the shop where I worked said that after a few months of his employing me the sales dropped drastically because people avoided purchasing and eating edibles prepared by Hindus. Many people opposed the large presence of Hindu employees at his shop and my boss felt pressured to change the situation," he added.
Ram said Sardari Lal and his brother Meena/Kartar had worked at the sweets shops for several years and made a decent living that allowed them to support their families.
He said other Muslims employees of the nearby shops discriminated against them and persecuted them. The shop owner was forced to think about their future at his establishment. "That was when the two brothers and their families decided to embrace Islam in order to keep their jobs and be secure," he added.
Ram confirmed that 13 family members of Sardari Lal, 12 members of Meena/ Kartar, their nephew Kans Raj's son Boota Ram along with three adults and several children of these families embraced Islam on May 14, 2010.
He said that Sardari Lal's older brothers Hans Raj and Kans Raj remained Hindus. Hans Raj too has said that he might consider converting to save his job. He said that life was 'just easier if one was Muslim' and he wouldn't be discriminated against.
Ram said that 14 Hindus of the Tapiala village had embraced Islam on May 17 because they were extremely poor and could not get jobs because no one would employ the large Hindu family.
He said that another relative of his, Parkash, who lived in the village of Seowal, along with his eight family members had embraced Islam in order to save their lands.
"After embracing Islam, Parkash Ram told me that Muslim neighbours had been mistreating him and had forced him to convert," Mangut Ram said.
Posted by Robert on June 7, 2010 3:47 AM
Sunday, June 6, 2010
The Emperor's New Clothes In Turkey
New Europe 6 June 2010
By Robert Ellis
The Danish writer of fairy tales, Hans Christian Andersen, has amused the world with his fable from 1837, “The Emperor’s New Clothes”. The story tells of two weavers who persuade an emperor that they can weave him a set of clothes that are invisible to those who are either incompetent or hopelessly stupid. Everybody, of course, is duped by the illusion, except a small boy, who, when he sees the emperor parading his new suit, yells: “But he’s got nothing on!”
The present Turkish government, formed by the AK (Justice and Development) Party in 2002, could be said to have played the same trick on gullible American and European politicians, who have wanted so much to believe that the AKP has spun the stuff of democracy.
For example, the former US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, in May 2007 declared that the AKP is “a government dedicated to pulling Turkey west toward Europe”. And Carl Bildt, the Swedish foreign minister, pronounced in March 2008: “The AKP government is made up of profound European reformers.” However, an examination of the facts could lead one to draw a different conclusion.
In 1999 the European Union agreed on Turkey’s candidacy, which in the next five years led to a flurry of reforms. For example, under the Ecevit government there was a reform of the Civil Code, introducing gender equality in the family, which according to religious conservatives would “create anarchy and chaos in the family” and “threaten the foundations of the Turkish nation”.
The death penalty was abolished, the right to broadcast in languages other than Turkish was guaranteed, and the role of the military was reduced, which included the appointment of a civilian secretary-general to the National Security Council. As a result, and despite reservations about implementation, the EU Commission declared in October 2004 that “Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be opened”.
“Sufficiently” was the ‘open sesame’ to Ali Baba’s cave, and once accession talks started a year later, there was a sudden loss of interest in the reform process. However, “the EU wills it” has been the AKP’s mantra to justify reforms which have been more concerned with implementing the party’s agenda than transforming Turkey into a liberal, democratic society.
The AKP’s electoral success in 2002 and 2007 gave the party a solid majority in Parliament but not the two-thirds necessary to bring about constitutional change.
However, through a policy of ‘kadrola?ma’ it has been able to fill most of the leading posts in state administration with the party faithful, particularly in the Ministry of Education. Independent boards, such as the Higher Education Board, inside banking, energy, and radio and tv, are no longer independent, and TÜBITAK (Turkey’s Scientific and Technological Research Council), Turkish Airlines and the state banks have come under party control. Despite Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s pre-election promises, there has been no limitation of deputies’ parliamentary immunity and an amendment of the Public Procurement Law in 2003 excluded energy, water, transportation and telecommunications contracts. A further amendment in 2008 rendered this “legal robbery enterprise” even more opaque.
A report published by the Open Society Foundation and Bosphorus University in 2009, “Being Different in Turkey”, confirms the efforts of the AKP government to transform Turkey into a conservative, religious society. Socially and professionally “neighbourhood pressure” is applied to ensure conformity to norms laid down by the party – attendance at Friday prayers, abstention from alcohol and wives being ‘covered’ i.e. wearing a headscarf.
The headscarf has played a major role on the AKP’s agenda, and as Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Refah (Welfare) Party (the AKP’s precursor, which was banned in 1998) warned: “[University] chancellors are going to retreat before the headscarf when Refah comes to power.”
The European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban on the (Islamic) headscarf at universities in 2005, as it “appeared to be imposed on women by a religious precept that was hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality”. According to Prime Minister Erdogan “On this issue, the court has no right to speak. That right belongs to the scholars of Islam (the ‘ulema’).” The AKP has made repeated efforts to ensure that graduates of the imam-hatip (religious) high schools are allowed to enter university on an equal footing with graduates from state high schools, but so far these attempts have been thwarted. The main obstacle to the AKP’s control of Turkish society has been opposition from the military and the judiciary. In July 2008 the Constitutional Court by 10 votes to one found the AKP guilty of being “the focal point of anti-secular activities” and its Treasury funding was halved. Prime Minister Erdogan is well known for his dislike of a critical press, and in 2007 Calik Holding, whose owner is a close friend of the Prime Minister’s, took over the Sabah-ATV media group, Turkey’s second largest, with the aid of loans from two state banks. The following year draconian tax fines totalling $3.2 billion were imposed on the Dogan Media Group, Turkey’s largest, after their exposure of corruption in government circles.
Since July 2007 hundreds of academics, journalists, politicians and officers have been detained and many charged with plotting to overthrow the AKP government in an alleged conspiracy known as the Ergenekon case. And the widespread wiretapping and surveillance of government opponents has created what Turkey’s Financial Times, Referans, last year in a headline called “The Republic of Fear”.
The recent constitutional amendments approved by Parliament and the President are primarily concerned with undermining the authority of the military, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, the AKP government’s main opponents.
The main political opposition has come from the CHP, the Republican People’s Party, which under the leadership of Deniz Baykal has for the last 18 years been moribund. However, the election of a modest accountant and outspoken opponent of corruption, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, as leader could well spell the end of the AKP government’s hegemony.
This is an edited version of a presentation given at the inaugural meeting of the Turkey Assessment Group in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 19 May 2010. Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish and international press.
Posted June 6th, 2010 by hrc
By Robert Ellis
The Danish writer of fairy tales, Hans Christian Andersen, has amused the world with his fable from 1837, “The Emperor’s New Clothes”. The story tells of two weavers who persuade an emperor that they can weave him a set of clothes that are invisible to those who are either incompetent or hopelessly stupid. Everybody, of course, is duped by the illusion, except a small boy, who, when he sees the emperor parading his new suit, yells: “But he’s got nothing on!”
The present Turkish government, formed by the AK (Justice and Development) Party in 2002, could be said to have played the same trick on gullible American and European politicians, who have wanted so much to believe that the AKP has spun the stuff of democracy.
For example, the former US Secretary of State, Condoleeza Rice, in May 2007 declared that the AKP is “a government dedicated to pulling Turkey west toward Europe”. And Carl Bildt, the Swedish foreign minister, pronounced in March 2008: “The AKP government is made up of profound European reformers.” However, an examination of the facts could lead one to draw a different conclusion.
In 1999 the European Union agreed on Turkey’s candidacy, which in the next five years led to a flurry of reforms. For example, under the Ecevit government there was a reform of the Civil Code, introducing gender equality in the family, which according to religious conservatives would “create anarchy and chaos in the family” and “threaten the foundations of the Turkish nation”.
The death penalty was abolished, the right to broadcast in languages other than Turkish was guaranteed, and the role of the military was reduced, which included the appointment of a civilian secretary-general to the National Security Council. As a result, and despite reservations about implementation, the EU Commission declared in October 2004 that “Turkey sufficiently fulfils the political criteria and recommends that accession negotiations be opened”.
“Sufficiently” was the ‘open sesame’ to Ali Baba’s cave, and once accession talks started a year later, there was a sudden loss of interest in the reform process. However, “the EU wills it” has been the AKP’s mantra to justify reforms which have been more concerned with implementing the party’s agenda than transforming Turkey into a liberal, democratic society.
The AKP’s electoral success in 2002 and 2007 gave the party a solid majority in Parliament but not the two-thirds necessary to bring about constitutional change.
However, through a policy of ‘kadrola?ma’ it has been able to fill most of the leading posts in state administration with the party faithful, particularly in the Ministry of Education. Independent boards, such as the Higher Education Board, inside banking, energy, and radio and tv, are no longer independent, and TÜBITAK (Turkey’s Scientific and Technological Research Council), Turkish Airlines and the state banks have come under party control. Despite Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdogan’s pre-election promises, there has been no limitation of deputies’ parliamentary immunity and an amendment of the Public Procurement Law in 2003 excluded energy, water, transportation and telecommunications contracts. A further amendment in 2008 rendered this “legal robbery enterprise” even more opaque.
A report published by the Open Society Foundation and Bosphorus University in 2009, “Being Different in Turkey”, confirms the efforts of the AKP government to transform Turkey into a conservative, religious society. Socially and professionally “neighbourhood pressure” is applied to ensure conformity to norms laid down by the party – attendance at Friday prayers, abstention from alcohol and wives being ‘covered’ i.e. wearing a headscarf.
The headscarf has played a major role on the AKP’s agenda, and as Necmettin Erbakan, leader of the Refah (Welfare) Party (the AKP’s precursor, which was banned in 1998) warned: “[University] chancellors are going to retreat before the headscarf when Refah comes to power.”
The European Court of Human Rights upheld the ban on the (Islamic) headscarf at universities in 2005, as it “appeared to be imposed on women by a religious precept that was hard to reconcile with the principle of gender equality”. According to Prime Minister Erdogan “On this issue, the court has no right to speak. That right belongs to the scholars of Islam (the ‘ulema’).” The AKP has made repeated efforts to ensure that graduates of the imam-hatip (religious) high schools are allowed to enter university on an equal footing with graduates from state high schools, but so far these attempts have been thwarted. The main obstacle to the AKP’s control of Turkish society has been opposition from the military and the judiciary. In July 2008 the Constitutional Court by 10 votes to one found the AKP guilty of being “the focal point of anti-secular activities” and its Treasury funding was halved. Prime Minister Erdogan is well known for his dislike of a critical press, and in 2007 Calik Holding, whose owner is a close friend of the Prime Minister’s, took over the Sabah-ATV media group, Turkey’s second largest, with the aid of loans from two state banks. The following year draconian tax fines totalling $3.2 billion were imposed on the Dogan Media Group, Turkey’s largest, after their exposure of corruption in government circles.
Since July 2007 hundreds of academics, journalists, politicians and officers have been detained and many charged with plotting to overthrow the AKP government in an alleged conspiracy known as the Ergenekon case. And the widespread wiretapping and surveillance of government opponents has created what Turkey’s Financial Times, Referans, last year in a headline called “The Republic of Fear”.
The recent constitutional amendments approved by Parliament and the President are primarily concerned with undermining the authority of the military, the Constitutional Court and the Supreme Board of Judges and Prosecutors, the AKP government’s main opponents.
The main political opposition has come from the CHP, the Republican People’s Party, which under the leadership of Deniz Baykal has for the last 18 years been moribund. However, the election of a modest accountant and outspoken opponent of corruption, Kemal Kilicdaroglu, as leader could well spell the end of the AKP government’s hegemony.
This is an edited version of a presentation given at the inaugural meeting of the Turkey Assessment Group in the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 19 May 2010. Robert Ellis is a regular commentator on Turkish affairs in the Danish and international press.
Posted June 6th, 2010 by hrc
Saturday, June 5, 2010
Thursday, June 3, 2010
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